The
Great Nuclear Debate
Something unusual is to happen during the
current session of parliament. There is
to be a fair and open debate, open to the public, the Labour Party and
parliament, on whether to order a successor to Britain’s
nuclear weapon, or, presumably, whether to scrap it, as the third alternative,
carrying on with an outdated weapon of mass destruction, would be unacceptably
dangerous. So the forthcoming debate is really about committing Britain to
nuclear weapons far into the future, or taking the opportunity to fulfil the
promise made under the NPT and rejoin the great majority of nations without
nuclear weapons. The only snag is that
the debate may be as managed as was the debate on Iraq,
where information was withheld, and scare tactics were used to ensure a result
desired by government. That ‘debate’
resulted in giving the decision to invade Iraq a
spurious democratic credential. The same
may happen with nuclear weapons.
The debate will
be unusual, in that there is to be a debate at all. The track record of our nuclear ‘deterrent’
is one of secrecy and outright deceit, somehow suitable to the subject. The original decision to go nuclear was made
secretly, by Attlee. Neither cabinet nor
parliament was consulted. Then came the secret decision to upgrade Polaris with Chevaline. Prime
ministers involved were Wilson, Heath, Callaghan and Thatcher. It was only when the expense of the upgrade
became too huge to hide any longer (£1.2 billion) that Chevaline
was forced out into the open. In 1980
the Conservative government simply announced the intention to upgrade to
Trident. No debate there. Then Thatcher, consulting only with her
minister Francis Pym, gave permission for US nuclear-armed cruise missiles to
be sited in Britain. In order to replace
Trident, the mutual defence agreement with the United States, which ran out at the end of 2004, had to be renewed. It was renewed, ‘on the nod’ without a
debate. So an open, fair debate in
parliament and even with the public, as has been promised, seems too good to be
true.
Perhaps such
openness has been forced upon leaders since the debacle of the Iraq war
– another scandal cannot be risked so soon.
Or perhaps the result of the debate has been calculated in advance, and
leaders are confident that there is little risk of failure. It is this possibility that has to be taken
most seriously. As recently as July ’04
Defence Secretary Reid announced: ‘The government remain committed to
maintaining the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent, including making the
necessary investment at the Atomic Weapons Establishment’. Money has recently been allocated for a
replacement for HELEN (High Energy Laser Embodying Neandymium). The work requires planning permission from
West Berkshire Council, and CND has asked residents of the area to object on
health and other grounds, but permission, always seeming certain, has now been
granted. The new laser will be a blatant
waste of public money if the forthcoming debate results in cancellation of
Trident! Or perhaps they can think of another use for a powerful laser that
replicates conditions of a nuclear explosion.
Reid has
already stated his view that Britain
needs the upgraded nuclear weapon so as to ‘deter’ future attacks of
unspecified nature – Cold War thinking that would ensure a return of nuclear
brinkmanship. He ignores the current
threat, made in a plainly stated US policy document ‘Joint Nuclear Operations’
(for details see Full Spectrum Dominance in this issue), that nuclear weapons
are being considered for actual use against non-nuclear nations, in flagrant
breach of international law as stated in the World Court judgement. The official thinking, such as it is, rejects
any progress towards a nuclear-free world.
And Iraq has shown that official thinking is very likely to get its way,
debate or no debate.
The importance
of the coming debate can hardly be overestimated. If settled fairly, there would be an
excellent chance of getting rid of Trident.
As Peter Preston, former editor of the Guardian put it in a recent
article: ‘Our non-independent old missiles give us a
bit of status, a bit of woolly public reassurance, a bit of summit
swagger. Why change anything? But everything, just like the oil price, is
changing minute by minute.’
A debate that
resulted in getting rid of our nuclear weapon would have two major
consequences. First, we would rejoin the
non-nuclear world and show the way towards world nuclear disarmament. Second, a victory over the plainly expressed
determination of the prime minister and his Executive would be a powerful
victory for British democracy. It would
prove that we had elected a proper parliament, and not an oligarchy.
H.D.